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Introduction 
A key feature of the post-war order, it is often said, is the unprecedented pace, scale 
and scope of global trade and investment. Few deny that the integration of the global 
economy has brought with it considerable benefits. Since Ricardo and Smith, econo-
mists have typically agreed that international trade is a catalyst for growth and pros-
perity. But trade may also involve harms, and much like the benefits of trade, these 
raise difficult questions regarding the justice of their distribution. In this paper, I ex-
amine a particularly important, yet often neglected form of harm, namely the public 
health effects of trade and investment in tobacco. 
 In at least one important way, tobacco is a unique commodity: it is the only legal 
consumer product that kills up to half of its users.1 With around 6 million deaths per 
year, tobacco-related diseases are the leading cause of premature mortality worldwide, 
claiming more lives than HIV/Aids, malaria and tuberculosis combined.2 And the 
death toll is only set to increase. If current trends persist, the 100 million tobacco-
attributable deaths in the 20th century will rise to a billion in this century.3 Relatively 
few of these deaths will occur in high-income countries, where increased public health 
efforts have succeeded in driving smoking rates down. They will primarily occur in 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization, Tobacco Fact Sheet, retrieved at http://www.wpro.who.int/mediacen-
tre/factsheets/fs_201203_tobacco/en/ (accessed 9.10.2018).  
2 World Health Organization, WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2015: Raising Taxes on Tobacco 
(Geneva: WHO, 2015), at p. 20. 
3 Prabhat Jha and Richard Peto, ‘Global Effects of Smoking, of Quitting, and of Taxing Tobacco,’ 
New England Journal of Medicine 370 (2014), 60-68, at p. 60. 
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low- and middle-income countries. Throughout Africa, for example, the number of 
adult smokers is estimated to increase from 77 million in 2013 to 572 million in 2100.4 
 The steep rise in tobacco consumption in low- and middle-income countries is 
causally linked to the liberalisation of international trade and foreign investment. In at 
least three different ways, our current global trade regime5 has allowed transnational 
tobacco companies to penetrate markets across the world. First, the reduction of trade 
barriers has led to greater market competition, thus decreasing prices and promoting 
tobacco use. Second, the liberalisation of investment laws has led to the privatisation 
of relatively inefficient domestic industries in developing countries, and acquisitions 
by (or mergers with) powerful and highly competent transnational tobacco companies. 
Third, the legal requirements imposed by free trade agreements have often been 
thought to conflict with tobacco control policies. In a recent case, for example, Philipp 
Morris International filed a complaint against Uruguay for increasing the size of 
graphic health warnings on cigarette packs. Although Uruguay ultimately won the case, 
many observers fear that the mere risk of litigation may dissuade other countries from 
adopting similar policies.6 
 Does our global trade regime, by allowing and promoting the worldwide spread of 
tobacco, harm people in low- and middle-income countries? On the one hand, the 
growing popularity of tobacco may simply reflect the changing preferences of con-
sumers across the world. Furthermore, as we noted at the outset, the liberalisation of 
trade and investment as a whole has had overwhelmingly positive effects, which ex-
plains why countries have been keen to partake in it. On the other hand, it is hard to 
describe the economic and human costs of this liberalisation as anything other than 
catastrophic in the case of tobacco. If these costs are deemed unjustifiable, then argu-
ably the global trade regime ought to be reformed so that they can be averted. For a 
minimal condition for the fairness of any institutional arrangement or social practice 
is that it does not impose undue harms on its participants. 
 I argue in this paper that the liberalisation of trade and investment in tobacco does 
indeed impose undue harms, and I sketch the kinds of institutional reforms that would 
                                                 
4 Evan Blecher and Hana Ross, ‘Tobacco Use in Africa: Tobacco Control through Prevention,’ 
American Cancer Society (2013), retrieved at: http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@inter-
nationalaffairs/documents/document/acspc-041294.pdf (accessed 20.08.2016). 
5 By ‘global trade regime,’ I mean the multilateral trade system maintained by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as well as the regional and bilateral trade agreements negotiated in accord-
ance with WTO law. 
6 For general evidence on the link between trade liberalisation and tobacco consumption, see Allyn 
Taylor et al., ‘The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Tobacco Consumption,’ in: Prabhat Jha and 
Frank Chaploupka (eds). Tobacco Control in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 343–63; World Health Organization, Confronting the Tobacco Epidemic in a New Era of Trade 
and Investment Liberalization (Geneva: WHO, 2012). For the effects of liberalising investment, see 
Anna Gilmore, Gary Fooks, and Martin McKee, ‘A Review of the Impacts of Tobacco Industry 
Privatisation: Implications for Policy.’ Global Public Health 6,6 (2011), 621–42. For a discussion of 
the ‘chilling effect’ on tobacco control policies, see Holly Jarman, The Politics of Trade and Tobacco 
Control (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2015), Ch. 1. 
3 
 
be necessary to prevent them. The discussion is divided into two parts. In the first I 
examine the meaning of harm, and show that both procedural as well as substantive 
concerns point to the harmfulness of trade in tobacco. The second part turns to the 
institutional implications. I defend the claim that tobacco ought to be exempted from 
free trade agreements, but I also argue for further, positive measures to enable low- 
and middle-income countries to safeguard public health. 
 
Identifying Undue Harms 
 
A harm is something that is bad for an agent: a setback to his or her interests.7 This, 
to be sure, is a rough sketch of a definition, and there are complex metaphysical ques-
tions surrounding the nature of harm. But let us put these to one side, and adopt an 
intuitive understanding of what it means to set back somebody’s interests. This leaves 
us with the normative question of what an undue harm is. When I hurt malicious ag-
gressors in self-defence, I am setting back their interests. And yet we commonly think 
that self-defence is a paradigm case of justified harming, one that no sensible legal 
system would criminalise. Analogously, we should only worry about the harms of 
global trade in tobacco if these are not justified, that is, if a just global trade regime 
would rule them out. 
 Like any institutional arrangement or social practice, the global trade regime sets 
back some people’s interests and advances the interests of others. A reduction in tar-
iffs, for example, tends to promote the interests of importers of a given commodity 
and depress those of domestic manufacturers. But when is it the case that setting back 
someone’s interests represents an undue harm? Broadly speaking, we can identify two 
types of criteria for the unjustifiability of a harm. The first concerns procedural prob-
lems in the way a setback comes about. For example, an institutional arrangement 
should not allow people’s interests to be set back due to interactions that involve ma-
nipulation, coercion or fraud. Here we insist that the interests of those who benefit 
from the interaction should not outweigh those of whom it disadvantages. The second 
type of criterion concerns substantive problems with the setback. For example, a pro-
cedurally fair interaction may lead to people falling below some minimally decent level 
of subsistence – an outcome that a just institutional arrangement should prevent or 
rectify. In what follows, I want to show that trade in tobacco raises both procedural 
and substantive concerns. 
 Let me begin with procedural concerns. Manipulation, coercion and fraud are 
wrong because they involve, in different ways, a lack of voluntariness on part of the 
harmed party. But in what sense is trade in tobacco non-voluntary? Modern economics 
                                                 
7 Cf. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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assumes that people’s preferences are revealed through their consumption habits: if 
people buy cigarettes, people want cigarettes. Though strictly speaking a descriptive 
and not a normative point, it is only a small step from here to the idea that we are 
responsible for our own preferences. Cigarettes may have become cheaper and more 
readily available in recent decades, but it is still up to each individual smoker to buy 
the next pack, and live (or die) by the consequences. The implication seems to be that 
there is no role for the state, or any other agent, to interfere with market transactions 
as a matter of justice. Markets do not impose undue harms; they merely reflect the 
preferences of consenting adults. 
 An immediate complication with this view is that many consumers of tobacco are 
neither consenting nor adults. We commonly take consent to imply some degree of 
rationality, informed reasoning and deliberation – attributes that are often lacking in 
the choice to consume tobacco. Many smokers pick up the habit as children or teen-
agers, and even adults are often poorly informed about its health risks. This is true in 
particular in low- and middle-income countries, where consumers haven’t been ex-
posed to decades of public health warnings. It is also somewhat doubtful, to say the 
least, whether the preference to continue (rather than start) consuming a product 
known to be as addictive as cocaine or heroin should be regarded as fully autonomous. 
Finally, tobacco consumption has considerable effects beyond producers and consum-
ers: second-hand smoking, for instance, inflicts harms on non-consenting third par-
ties.8 In light of these issues, most people believe that just states must implement a set 
of tobacco control policies—regulations of advertisement, restrictions of sales, public 
awareness campaigns etc.—to minimise non-voluntary exposure to the risks of smok-
ing. 
 Now, someone might concede this point, but question its relevance. Whether is-
sues of voluntariness arise in the case of individual consumers is beside the point, the 
objection goes, because the fairness of the global trade regime turns exclusively on 
whether states agree to the liberalisation of trade. Each sovereign state is responsible 
for its own tobacco control policies: some states prioritise population health and aim 
to ensure that consumers make informed choices; others follow a more laissez-faire 
approach. Either way, by agreeing to participate in the global economy, states take 
responsibility for the ensuing public health effects. Compare: if I agree to participate 
in a bike race, and choose not to insure my bike, it is up to me—and not to the organ-
isers of the race—to bear the costs if I crash. Similarly, the argument goes, sovereign 
states that consent to the liberalisation of trade and investment in tobacco cannot com-
plain about the ensuing adverse effects on their population’s health. 
 There are two plausible replies to this objection. The first accepts the premise that 
states voluntarily agree to the liberalisation of trade and investment in tobacco, but 
denies that they ought to be allowed to do so. While I may do as I please with my bike, 
                                                 
8 For an excellent overview of these points, see Robert Goodin, ‘The Ethics of Smoking,’ Ethics 
99,3 (1989), 574-624. 
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I am typically not allowed to impose involuntary costs (including risks) on other peo-
ple, even if I act legitimately on their behalf. Much like we do not think that parents 
ought to be allowed to make reckless choices that seriously endanger the well-being of 
their children, states should not be allowed to sign international agreements that un-
dermine the human right to health of their citizens. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that many states are undemocratic, making it unclear whether they possess the 
legitimacy to act on behalf of their citizens in the first place. A global trade regime 
imposes undue harms when it permits illegitimate or reckless states to submit their 
populations to serious, involuntary health risks.9 
 The second reply challenges the premise that the liberalisation of trade in tobacco 
is fully voluntary. I may choose not to participate in a bike race. But few countries can 
afford not to participate in the global economy. This is true in particular for low- and 
middle-income countries. When resource exports are a primary source of revenue, it 
is costly not to agree to the liberalisation of trade. When domestic capital is scarce, it 
is costly not to agree to the liberalisation of investment. Quite generally, the voluntar-
iness of a given choice is more likely to be compromised if the costs attached to all 
alternatives are intolerably high. And as a matter of historical fact, low- and middle-
income countries have often been denied the possibility of exempting their tobacco 
sectors from free trade agreements. For example, through threats of retaliatory sanc-
tions, the USA applied intense pressure on East Asian countries in the 1990s to liber-
alise their tobacco sectors, resulting in a marked increase of smoking rates.10 Given the 
oft-noted power asymmetries in negotiations concerning the rules of trade,11 voluntar-
iness is far from clear. 
 To be sure, not all arrangements that involve involuntariness are unjustified. For 
example, our cities expose us to some degree of environmental pollution that we have 
not explicitly consented to. But if these environmental costs are small, and in turn the 
benefits we derive from living in cities are large, we may think that we are not being 
unduly harmed. This is where the question of harm ceases to be a purely procedural 
matter. When we say that a social arrangement imposes undue harms, we often mean 
that it distributes costs and burdens in ways that cannot be justified to those who have 
to bear them. In order to determine whether this is the case, I want to suggest, we must 
compare the individual moral weight of the reasons that each affected party has for 
rejecting the arrangement in question.12 In other words, we must proceed by weighing 
                                                 
9 See also James Christensen, Trade Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), for similar 
arguments applied to trade in weapons and hazardous waste. 
10 See e.g. Glenn Frankel, ‘U.S. Aided Cigarette Firms in Conquests across Asia,’ Washington Post, 
17th November 1996; Page A01. 
11 See e.g. Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Ch. 3. 
12 This approach is broadly contractualist in a Scanlonian sense, but I also think that an alternative 
utilitarian approach would reach similar conclusions in our particular case (since, as we will see, an 
interpersonal aggregation of the burdens of trade in tobacco clearly outweigh the associated bene-
fits). 
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the relevant interests at stake to uncover substantive concerns with the liberalisation 
of trade and investment in tobacco. 
 Given the immense human toll of increased tobacco consumption, the interests in 
favour of trade in tobacco would need to be particularly important for it to be justified. 
The most obvious interests to consider are those of producers and merchants of to-
bacco products. Few would think that the profits of tobacco companies, who are 
among the most powerful corporations in the world, are of greater moral importance 
than the health of millions of people worldwide. But a restriction of trade in tobacco 
may perhaps have grave economic consequences. Since the 1960s, the bulk of tobacco 
production has moved away from the United States to low- and middle-income coun-
tries. For example, China and India are now the first and third biggest producers of 
tobacco leaf worldwide. Would the restriction of trade in tobacco harm the economic 
prospects of these societies, and deprive poor tobacco farmers and workers of their 
means of subsistence? 
 Jobs in the tobacco industry are notoriously exploitative. Wages are so low that 
workers must often rely on their children’s (unpaid) labour to make ends meet. Hours 
are long, and there are considerable health hazards.13 Despite these facts, it is some-
times said that exploitative jobs are better than no jobs, and that child- and sweatshop 
labour is an important (and merely temporary) step on the path toward economic de-
velopment.14 Whatever we make of these arguments in general, however, with regard 
to the tobacco industry they are not persuasive. Although the tobacco industry likes to 
emphasise its importance to local economies, of the 125 tobacco exporting countries, 
only 17 derive more than 1% of their total export earnings from tobacco. In fact, only 
in five countries does tobacco account for more than 5% of export earnings, and even 
there the industry is but a small source of jobs.15 Tobacco production may also crowd 
out other forms of similarly labour-intensive agriculture. Finally, it is worth emphasis-
ing that few of the profits of tobacco production stay in poor countries, since most of 
the production is owned by a handful of transnational companies based in rich coun-
tries. 
 It is likely still the case that some individual tobacco workers would be worse-off 
if trade in tobacco were restricted. But their interests must be weighed against those 
of others who suffer under the current trade regime. And indeed, the economic effects 
on others are quite significant. An early study that weighed the economic benefits of 
tobacco against its costs estimated that every 1000 additional tonnes of tobacco traded 
                                                 
13 Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Golden Leaf, Barren Harvest: The Costs of Tobacco Farming (Wash-
ington D.C.: Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001), at p. 20; World Health Organization, Tobacco 
and Poverty: A Vicious Circle (Geneva: WHO, 2004). 
14 E.g. Bas Van der Vossen and Jason Brennan, In Defense of Openness: Why Global Freedom Is the 
Humane Solution to Global Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
15 World Health Organization, Tobacco and Poverty, p. 10. 
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in the global market lead to a net loss of more than 27 million USD.16 These losses are 
not evenly distributed: in rich and in poor countries, smoking is associated with lower 
socioeconomic status. But unlike in rich countries, where the costs of healthcare and 
lost productivity are to some extent spread across society as a whole, in poor countries 
they can be catastrophic for individuals and families, as livelihoods are destroyed by 
incapacitating illness and lost earnings.17 Moreover, while these losses are substantive, 
the benefits are transferable: if tobacco consumption were eliminated, an influential 
World Bank study found, ‘money spent on tobacco would be spent on other goods 
and services, thereby generating more jobs.’18 
 In short: aside from the profits that multinational corporations make, trade in to-
bacco produces little economic benefit. Though some tobacco workers may become 
worse off—at least in the short term—if trade in tobacco were restricted, their interests 
must be weighed against the interests in life and health of many others who are equally 
badly off. These considerations, together with the worries about voluntariness we 
raised before, point to the conclusion that our current regime of unrestricted trade in 
tobacco imposes undue harms. 
Reforming the Global Trade Regime 
If trade in tobacco is unduly harmful, what should be done? The most radical position 
is abolitionist. A 1984 editorial in The Lancet, Britain’s leading medical journal, opined: 
‘Wilberforce succeeded after 40 years. We shall have to take much stronger action if, 
with regard to smoking, we are to emulate his achievement.’19 The analogy may strike 
some as distasteful, but many public health experts and ethicists agree that the tremen-
dous harms of tobacco outweigh the loss of liberty that a total ban would represent.20 
Indeed, from the point of view of public health, the case for banning tobacco seems a 
lot stronger than the case for banning other drugs such as cannabis, LSD, or ecstasy. 
So does a just global trade regime rule out any trade in tobacco? 
 A global ban might be justified if buying and selling tobacco were always wrong, 
even within domestic markets. But there are several good arguments against this posi-
tion. Apart from well-known anti-paternalistic worries about such a ban, there are 
                                                 
16 See Howard Barnum, ‘The Economic Burden of the Global Trade in Tobacco,’ Tobacco Control 
3,4 (1994), 358-61, at p. 359. A more recent systematic review of the economic evidence confirms 
that the direct costs and externalities of tobacco far outweigh its benefits, see Victor Ekpu and 
Abraham Brown, ‘The Economic Impact of Smoking and of Reducing Smoking Prevalence: Re-
view of Evidence,’ Tobacco Use Insights 8 (2015), 1-35. 
17 World Health Organization, Tobacco and Poverty. 
18 Prabhat Jha and Frank Chaploupka, Curbing the Epidemic. Governments and the Economics of Tobacco 
Control (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1999), at p. 68. 
19 ‘Editorial: Third World Smoking - The New Slave Trade,’ The Lancet 323,8367 (1984), 23-4. 
20 Kalle Grill and Kristin Voigt, ‘The Case for Banning Cigarettes,’ Journal of Medical Ethics 42,5, 
(2016), 293-301; Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for 
Abolition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011). 
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pragmatic considerations regarding transition costs and the emergence of black mar-
kets, as well as concerns about the suffering it could inflict on addicted smokers. The 
more general point, though, is this: arguably it is possible to impose tough public health 
measures (taxes, labelling requirements, advertising prohibitions etc.) that limit to-
bacco consumption to those who truly consent to the risks. If two countries with such 
tough measures in place were then to engage in trade in tobacco, they would not be 
imposing involuntary, unjustifiable risks on their citizens. In other words, a trade re-
gime that allowed these transactions would not raise the procedural and substantive 
worries that we discussed. 
 Hence a more promising approach, I believe, consists not in banning, but in ex-
empting tobacco from trade liberalisation – a goal that the international tobacco control 
community has pursued since the early 2000s.21 In practice, this would mean that coun-
tries should not have to subject their tobacco control regulations to rules established 
through WTO or other trade agreements. Although there are provisions under WTO 
law that allow countries to prioritise public health over trade liberalisation, these place 
the burden of proof on countries to show that their proposed policies are necessary, 
appropriate and consistent with other trade obligations.22 A true tobacco exemption, 
in contrast, would not require meeting this burden of proof. Having to show, for in-
stance, that a tariff on imported cigarettes complies with WTO rules is an unjustified 
cost on the country adopting the measure, even if it is later ruled that it does comply. 
 Now, someone might agree that there is a need to restrict the harms of trade in 
tobacco, and yet take issue with the policy of exemption. It has been argued, for ex-
ample, that exempting tobacco would allow countries to block the importation of to-
bacco merely for protectionist reasons - that is, without any public health rationale. 
North America and Europe could impose trade barriers on imported tobacco goods 
whilst continuing to subsidise their own tobacco industries.23 Thus, the strategy of ex-
emption might ultimately lead to greater harm to low- and middle-income countries, 
without really reducing the consumption of tobacco. Furthermore, a critic might add, 
the exemption strategy needlessly violates the widely accepted norm of non-discrimi-
nation. Instead of undermining the exports of foreign businesses, any country could 
simply adopt tough public health measures that impose restrictions on domestic and 
foreign tobacco companies in equal measure. 
 But both objections are misguided. Take first the claim that the exemption strategy 
might ultimately harm low- and middle-income countries. To make sense of this claim, 
we would need to weigh the disadvantages of not being able to export to high-income 
countries against the health- and non-health-related advantages of being able to restrict 
                                                 
21 Cynthia Callard, Hatai Chitanondh, and Robert Weissman, ‘Why Trade and Investment Liberal-
isation May Threaten Effective Tobacco Control Efforts,’ Tobacco Control 10,1 (2001), 68-70. 
22 Taylor et al., Impact of Trade Liberalisation, 348. 
23 Benn McGrady, ‘Trade Liberalisation and Tobacco Control: Moving from a Policy of Exclusion 
Towards a More Comprehensive Policy,’ Tobacco Control 16,4 (2007), 280-3. 
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imports. For a vast majority of people in low- and middle income countries, the ben-
efits of restricted trade in tobacco are substantial. And while a few tobacco-exporting 
countries may benefit from liberalisation, the gains are typically modest, as we saw 
before. Hence the exemption strategy is unlikely to harm these countries. It is true, of 
course, that any country could continue to subsidise their own tobacco sector, and fail 
to implement tougher tobacco control policies on a domestic level. Yet this would be 
no fault of the global trade regime. 
 Consider now the claim that there are non-discriminatory alternatives to the policy 
of exemption. This clearly presupposes that any tobacco control measure that a coun-
try might want to adopt is compatible with the terms of existing trade agreements. 
Even if we grant this controversial premise, however, it does not follow that these 
alternative policies are in fact realistic and feasible. Take the case of Thailand, whose 
government attempted to ban foreign cigarettes in the 1990s. A GATT panel ruled 
against this ban, to which Thailand appealed by arguing that foreign cigarettes were 
more addictive, and that advertisement by transnational tobacco companies was much 
more effective in promoting tobacco consumption. The GATT panel was unper-
suaded. It argued that Thailand could have adopted alternative, non-discriminatory 
public health measures, such as general advertising and labelling restrictions. What the 
panel didn’t consider, however, were the potential administrative and compliance costs 
of these alternative measures, and the difficulties of effectively implementing them in 
a developing-country setting.24 For a country like Thailand, maintaining the highly in-
efficient state-run tobacco monopolies was bound to keep smoking rates lower than 
opening the internal market up to multinational companies, whilst simultaneously at-
tempting to implement complex tobacco control regulation. As a commentator put it 
at the time, a ban on foreign cigarettes was ‘exactly what a doctor might have or-
dered.’25 
 Let me finally turn to a more practical objection to the exemption strategy. Even 
if tobacco were exempted from all future trade agreements, there is a vast and complex 
body of law established by already existing trade and investment agreements. Transna-
tional tobacco companies can make use of these older agreements to press claims 
against governments that enact tobacco control legislation. Consider once again 
Philipp Morris International’s lawsuit against Uruguay. One particularity of the case 
was that PMI used the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism of a bilateral trade 
agreement between Uruguay and Switzerland, where some of its holding companies 
are located. This exemplifies the ability of transnational companies to ‘forum-shop,’ 
that is, to find trade agreements signed by countries in which they have commercial 
                                                 
24 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox. Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can’t Coexist (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 195. It’s not surprising that the panel did not consider 
this: arbitration panels are composed of international trade lawyers, not public health experts. 
25 Frankel, U.S. Aided Cigarette Firms, p. A01. 
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interests, and launch disputes through these agreements. The strategy is highly effec-
tive, as there are now thousands of bilateral and regional trade agreements to choose 
from.26 
 Another notable feature of the Uruguay case is the power asymmetry between to-
bacco companies and many developing countries. In 2002, the three largest tobacco 
companies—British American Tobacco, Philipp Morris and Japan Tobacco—had 
combined revenues of more than 121 billion USD. This was, at the time, more than 
the total combined GDP of Albania, Bahrain, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica,  Jordan,  Macedonia,  Ma-
lawi,  Malta, Moldova,  Mongolia,  Namibia,  Nepal,  Paraguay,  Senegal, Tajikistan, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.27 In PMI’s challenge against Uruguay, for ex-
ample, the high legal costs of the proceedings meant that Uruguay may have had to 
abandon the case, had it not been for American billionaire Michael Bloomberg’s deci-
sion to financially support its defence.28 Far from showing that the current system 
works, the case of Uruguay is best seen as exceptional. 
 To be sure, this does not show that the exemption strategy is misguided. It does 
show, however, that it would need to be complemented with positive steps to help 
countries avoid the harms of trade. In this context, the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) deserves attention. The FCTC is a global public health treaty 
that entered into force in 2005, and has been ratified by 180 countries. It places binding 
obligations on states to enact a minimum set of proven tobacco control measures, such 
as rules concerning taxation, product content regulation, packaging, labelling, and ad-
vertisement. Although the final text of the FCTC does not explicitly mention trade, 
the rationale for its adoption was to establish universal standards to counteract the 
global spread of tobacco. As one observer put it, ‘the FCTC is an attempt to develop 
a form of health governance capable of effectively regulating transnational corpora-
tions.’29 
 It is perhaps too early to pass judgment on the success of the FCTC. Although 
implementation has been slow and partial, the binding nature of the FCTC has cer-
tainly supported public health authorities in enacting tobacco control measures.30 
However, one clear limitation of the FCTC is its domestic focus: it does not contain 
obligations that states have towards each other, since these were opposed by high-
income countries. But given the asymmetries in power, resources and expertise be-
tween poor and rich countries, ensuring that all countries can avoid the harms of trade 
                                                 
26 Jarman, Politics of Trade and Tobacco Control, p. 72. 
27 World Health Organization, Tobacco and Poverty, p. 9. 
28 Heather Wipfli, The Global War on Tobacco: Mapping the World's First Public Health Treaty (Baltimore : 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), at p. 132. 
29 Jeff Collin, ‘Tobacco Politics,’ Development 47,3 (2004), 91-6, at p. 91. 
30 Thomas Bollyky ‘Has a Global Tobacco Treaty Made a Difference?’ The Atlantic, 28th February 
2015, retrieved at: http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/has-a-global-tobacco-
treaty-made-a-difference/386399/ (accessed 8.11.2016). 
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would require certain redistributive policies. We could envisage, for instance, some 
form of assistance pool to provide economic and legal assistance to low- and middle-
income countries whose tobacco control policies are challenged by transnational to-
bacco companies under free trade agreements.31 In short, exempting tobacco from 
trade and investment agreements is a plausible policy to restrict the harms of trade, but 
in practice it would need to be complemented by positive steps. 
Conclusion 
Traditionally, much of our thinking about global trade has been dominated by the way 
it shapes the wealth of nations. Its effects on population health, in contrast, have re-
ceived far less attention. As the single most preventable cause of death in the world 
today, tobacco deserves special scrutiny. Each year, six trillion cigarettes are smoked; 
‘enough to make a continuous chain from the earth to the sun and back, with enough 
left over for a couple of round trips to Mars.’32 This staggering scale of tobacco-con-
sumption is linked to the liberalisation of international trade and investment, which is 
neither natural nor unavoidable, but driven by socially alterable institutions and prac-
tices. It’s a matter of social choice what kind of global trade regime we design and 
collectively impose on one another. But in any case, this imposition must be justified, 
and a first step towards this goal is to desist from harm. 
                                                 
31 E.g. Eric Gottwald, ‘Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration,’ American University International Law Review 
22 (2006): 237-75. 
32 Proctor, Golden Holocaust, p. 3. 
